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WILL NEW APPOINTEES TO THE SUPREME
COURT BE ABLE TO EFFECT AN
OVERRULING OF ROE v. WADE?
RICHARD

H.W.

MALOY*

INTRODUCTION

A recent feature story in Time magazine stated, "Overturning
Roe v. Wade is the Evangelicals' highest ambition .... "1 This was
supplemental to a previous blurb, under a photo of the U.S. Su
preme Court Justices, that proclaimed, "Bush may name replace
ments for as many as three of the Justices . . . . "2 Recent and
impending changes in the composition of the Supreme Court beg
the question whether President Bush could appoint a sufficient
number of Supreme Court Justices to overrule Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. 113 (1975).3 This Article argues that, regardless of any agenda
on the part of new appointees to the Supreme Court, it is very un
likely that Roe will be overruled in the near future. If an appointee
were intent on the overruling of Roe, that person would have to
establish, and convince at least four of his or her fellow justices, that
the holding of Roe is at odds with the supreme law of this land-the
United States Constitution. This would not be an easy task: Roe is

* Richard H. W. Maloy is a visiting professor of law at St. Thomas University
School of Law in Miami, Florida. The author would like to thank Sarah L. Santos,
Articles Editor of the Western New England Law Review, for her invaluable assistance
in the preparation of this article.
1. Karen Tumulty & Matthew Cooper, What Does Bush Owe The Religious
Right?, TIME, February 7, 2005, at 28.
2. Id. at 30; see Kenneth L. Manning, Bruce A. Carroll & Robert A. Carp,
George W. Bush's Potential Supreme Court Nominees: What Impact Might They Have?,
85 JUDICATURE 278, in seriatim (2002); William P. Marshall, The Judicial Nomination
Wars, 39 U. RICH. L. REV. 819,825 (2005); Alissa Schecter, Choosing Balance: Con
gressional Powers And The Partial-Birth Abortion Act of 2003, 73 FORDHAM L. REV.
1987, 1988 n.12 (2005); Carl Hulse, Abortion Remark by G.O.P Senator Puts Heat on
Peers, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 6, 2004, at AI; Robin Toner, Changing Senate Looks Much
Better to Abortion Foes, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 2,2004, at A39.
3. On July 1, 2005, Justice O'Connor announced her retirement effective upon
the confirmation of her successor. Chief Justice Rehnquist died on September 3, 2005.
On September 29, 2005 he was replaced by Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr.
29
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founded in the constitutional principles of the separation of church
and state and rights of privacy, among others.
Part I of this Article describes Roe in detail; Part II discusses
the principal Supreme Court progeny of Roe and distills from them
four reasons why an overruling of Roe is unlikely. First, the over
ruling of Roe would advance the essentially sectarian position that
life begins at conception - a judicial construct that would violate
the constitutional principle of separation of church and state. Sec
ond, what constitutes a "substantial obstacle" and "nonviable fetus"
will be grist for the litigation mill to come, but determining these
questions does not require an overruling of Roe. Third, a majority
of the Court currently supports an "emerging awareness" theory of
the right to privacy, and will therefore continue to deem abortion a
privacy right. Finally, if Lawrence v. Texas is any indication, an
overruling of Roe would require some agreement among the jus
tices that factors beyond philosophy demonstrate the unworkability
of Roe's holding. Part III concludes that an overruling of Roe is,
therefore, unlikely.
I.

ROE V. WADE

(1973)4

The seminal case of Roe v. Wade began when a pregnant, sin
gle woman using the pseudonym "Jane Roe" sued Henry Wade, the
District Attorney of Dallas County, Texas. s She alleged the uncon
stitutionality of certain articles of the Texas Penal Code, which
make it a crime to procure or attempt an abortion, as therein de
fined, except for the purpose of saving the life of the mother.
The action was consolidated with another case 6 for trial before
a three-judge District Court. Declaratory judgment was granted by
the District CourF pursuant to the following conclusions of law:
(3) The fundamental right of single women and married persons
4. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
5. Roe v. Wade, 314 F. Supp 1217, 1219 (N.D. Tex. 1970), affd in part, rev'd in
part, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
6. Doe v. Bolton, 319 F. Supp. 1048 (N.D. Ga. 1970). A married couple, using the
pseudonym "John and Mary Doe," filed a companion complaint to that of Jane Roe,
alleging that if the wife became pregnant, they wished to terminate her pregnancy for
both medical and financial reasons. The District Court dismissed the Does' complaint
for lack of standing. Roe, 314 F. Supp. at 1225. On appeal, the Supreme Court af
firmed, finding that the Does' position, that if contraceptive devices failed and if Mrs.
Doe became pregnant she would be prevented from having an abortion, presented only
a "speculative" claim of an "indirect injury," not within the realm of a "controversy" as
required by Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 41 (1971). Roe, 410 U.S. at 128.
7. Roe, 314 F. Supp at 1225.
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to choose whether to have children is protected by the Ninth
Amendment,S through the Fourteenth Amendment. 9
(4) The Texas Abortion Laws infringe upon this right.
(5) The defendant has not demonstrated that the infringement of
plaintiffs' Ninth Amendment rights by the Texas Abortion Laws
is necessary to support a compelling state interest.
(6) The Texas Abortion Laws are consequently void on their face
because they are unconstitutionally overbroad.
(7) The Texas Abortion Laws are void on their face because they
are vague in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Four
teenth Amendment. lo
(8) Abstention, concerning plaintiffs' request for an injunction
against the enforcement of the Texas Abortion Laws, is
warranted.
The court held the Texas Abortion Laws unconstitutionally
vague but, reluctant to involve itself in state criminal law, did not
grant an injunction against their enforcement.l l The plaintiffs ap
pealed the denial of injunctive relief to the Supreme Court, and
took protective appeals to the Fifth Circuit, which held the appeals
in abeyance pending decision in the Supreme Court.l2 Thus we
have Roe v. Wade, in which the Supreme Court issued a seven to
two decision 13 affirming in part and reversing in part14 the ruling of
the three-judge District Court in Dallas County, Texas.1 5
8. The Ninth Amendment provides, "The enumeration in the Constitution, of
certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the peo
ple." U.S. CONST. amend. IX. The Supreme Court was not in agreement with the con
clusion of the District Court that this was the governing provision. See Roe, 410 U.S. at
154. The District Court probably was influenced by the Supreme Court's reference to
the Ninth Amendment in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965), a case that
did not concern abortion, but which held unconstitutional a state statute forbidding the
use of contraceptives by married people.
9. The Supreme Court never explicitly said that the woman's right to an abortion
was "fundamental." Roe, 410 U.S. at 152. Justice Scalia, in his dissent in Lawrence v.
Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 594 (2003), thought that Roe stood for that position, but that
Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992), by implication did away
with that holding.
10. The Supreme Court did not reach the vagueness issue. Roe, 410 U.S. at 164.
11. Roe, 314 F. Supp. at 1224.
12. Roe, 410 U.S. at 122.
13. Roe, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). Chief Justice Burger and Justices Powell, Biackmun,
Brennan, Douglas, Marshall, and Stewart constituted the majority. Justice White dis
sented, joined by then Justice Rehnquist, who wrote a separate dissenting opinion. The
Chief Justice and Justices Douglas and Stewart wrote concurring opinions.
14. The only part of the District Court's ruling that was reversed was its failure to
dismiss the intervening physician's complaint. Id., 410 U.S. at 166.
15. The Court did not decide whether the District Court erred in withholding
injunctive relief because it assumed that the Texas prosecutorial authorities "will give
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Justice Blackmun, writing for the majority, addressed eight
matters of general interest pertaining to abortion policy: (1) ancient
attitudes about abortions,16 (2) the Hippocratic Oath,17 (3) the
common law,18 (4) the English statutory law,19 (5) the American
law,2° (6) the position of the American Medical Association,21 (7)
the position of the American Public Health Association,22 and (8)
the position of the American Bar Association. 23 In considering
these eight matters, the Court demonstrated a willingness to take
into account not only traditional notions of individual privacy
rights, but also the positions of the medical and scientific
community.
Justice Blackmun also considered the reasons advanced to "ex
plain historically the enactment of criminal abortion laws in the
19th century and to justify their continued existence."24 He dis
missed, almost immediately, the first reason, "a Victorian social
concern to discourage illicit sexual conduct,"25 by reciting that
full credence to this decision that the present criminal abortion statutes of that State are
unconstitutional." Id. at 166.
16. Id. at 130. Ancient religion did not ban abortions. Id. In a later part of his
opinion Justice Blackmun stated that the Stoics thought that life does not begin until
live birth. Id. at 160.
17. Id at 130-32. Though the Hippocratic Oath provided that "I will not give to a
woman a pessary to procure an abortion" it was the standard of some, but not all of the
physicians of the time. Id. at 131.
18. Id. at 132-36. It was doubtful that "abortion was ever firmly established as a
common law crime even with respect to the destruction of a quick fetus." Id. at 136. A
quick fetus is a fetus that has made "its first recognizable movement ... in utero." Id. at
132.
19. Id. at 136-38. The present English statute "permits a physician, without the
concurrence of others, to terminate pregnancy where he is of the good faith opinion
that the abortion is immediately necessary to save the life or to protect grave perma
nent injury to the physical or mental health of the pregnant woman." Id. at 138.
20. Id. at 138-41. At the time of the adoption of the Constitution and throughout
the majority of the nineteenth century, abortion was viewed with less disfavor than
under most American statutes currently in effect. "Even later, the law continued for
some time to treat less punitively an abortion procured in early pregnancy." Id. at 141.
21. Id. at 141-44. The American Medical Association has taken the position that
"abortion is a medical procedure that should be performed by a licensed physician in an
accredited hospital only after consultation with two other physicians and in conformity
with state law and that no party to the procedure should be required to violate person
ally held moral principles." Id. at 143.
22. Id. at 144-46. The American Public Health Association has taken the position
that abortions should be performed by physicians or osteopaths who are licensed to
practice and who have adequate training. Id. at 146.
23. Id. at 146-47. The American Bar Association approved the Uniform Abor
tion Act. Id. at 146.
24. Id. at 147.
25. Id. at 148-49.
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neither the courts nor commentators have taken that position seri
ously, and it is not a proper state concern. 26 The second reason
merited more attention. That reason was that when anti-abortion
laws were first enacted, the woman's health was a major concern of
the state because of the hazardous nature of the abortion proce
dure. 27 Though modern medical techniques have mitigated that
concern, "the State retains a definite interest in protecting the wo
man's own health and safety when an abortion is proposed at a late
stage of pregnancy."28 The third reason extended the concept that
the later the abortion occurs in the pregnancy the greater the dan
ger. 29 While not attempting a determination of when life begins,3°
the Court said that "[i]n assessing the State's interest, recognition
may be given to the less rigid claim that as long as at least potential
life is involved, the State may assert interests beyond the protection
of the pregnant woman alone."31
The next section of the opinion dealt with Jane Roe's main ar
gument that the Texas statutes denied her a right of privacy, which
included an absolute right to "terminate her pregnancy at whatever
time ... and for whatever reason, she alone chooses."32 The Court
had no difficulty deciding that the right of privacy, whether it be
founded in the Fourteenth Amendment (which the Court es
poused), or in the Ninth Amendment (espoused by the District
Court), included "the abortion decision."33 In essence the holding
of Roe has two elements, and is as follows:
(1) the liberty guaranteed by the Constitution encompasses a
right of privacy;34 and
(2) that right of privacy encompasses the right to abort an un
26.

See id. at 148.

27.
28.
29.

[d.
[d. at 150.
[d.

30. See id. But cf the Court's reference to "prenatal life." [d. at 155-56.
31. [d. at 150.
32. [d. at 153; see id. at 120, 152-56.
33. [d. at 154. The Court stressed the importance of the relationship between the
patient and her physician. [d. at 153, 156.
34. [d. at 152. The Court relied primarily on Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438
(1972), Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969), Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), Katz v.
United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967), Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942), Palko v.
Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937), Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928),
Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925), Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923),
and Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886) for that proposition. Roe, 410 U.S. at
152-53.
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wanted pregnancy.35
The Court recognized, however, that "a State may properly as
sert important interests in safeguarding health, in maintaining med
ical standards, and in protecting potentiallife."36 Hence, the right
of personal privacy "is not unqualified and must be considered
against important state interests in regulation."37 Referring to re
cent abortion cases that struck down anti-abortion statutes, the
Court said that it "generally scrutinized the State's interests in pro
tecting health and potential life and have concluded that neither
interest justified broad limitations on the reasons for which a physi
cian and his patient might decide that she have an abortion in the
early stages of pregnancy."38
Part IX of the opinion set forth the Court's response to Texas's
argument that, because a "person" is created at conception, the
State has an interest in protecting that person during the length of
the pregnancy.39 The Court first noted, "[N]o case could be cited
that holds that a fetus is a person within the meaning of the Four
teenth Amendment"40 and "[t]he Constitution does not define 'per
son' in so many words."41 The Court further observed that
"throughout the major portion of the 19th century prevailing legal
abortion practices were far freer than they are today, [which] per
suades us that the word 'person,' as used in the Fourteenth Amend
ment, does not include the unborn."42 Not being completely
satisfied with that response to the State, but also not wishing to
consider the "difficult question of when life begins"43 or enter that
"most sensitive and difficult"44 area of discussion, the Court ex
plored the point at which the State has such a compelling interest in
protecting "the mother or that of potential human life"45 that the
35. Roe, 410 U.S. at 153-54. The Court relied upon Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200
(1927) and Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905) to establish that the Court has
refused to recognize that this right is unlimited. Roe, 410 U.S. at 153-54.
36. Roe, 410 U.S. at 153-54. In fact, Justice Blackmun considered the outline of
the State's interests in abortion (see infra text accompanying note 53) the "holding" of
the case. Id. at 165.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 156.
39. Id. at 156-62.
40. Id. at 157.
41. /d.
42. Id. at 158.
43. See id. at 159.
44. See id. at 160.
45. Id. at 159.
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State might become "significantly involved."46 It was here that the
Court used two words which paved the way for its related "trimes
ter framework"47 set forth in Part X. The Court stated that the
fetus must be "viable48 or at least quick,"49 in order for the State to
invoke rules and regulations about protecting the life, or the poten
tial life of the fetus-though adding the caveat that "the unborn
have never been recognized in the law as persons in the whole
sense."50
In Part X of its opinion the Court developed what it later
called its "rigid trimester framework,"51 which identifies the point
in pregnancy after which a state "may regulate the abortion proce
dure to the extent that the regulation reasonably relates to the pres
ervation and protection of maternal health."
This means ... that, for the period of pregnancy prior to this
"compelling" point, the attending physician, in consultation with
his patient, is free to determine, without regulation by the State,
that, in his medical judgment, the patient's pregnancy should be
terminated. If that decision is reached, the judgment may be ef
fectuated by an abortion free of interference by the State. 52

Part XI of the opinion summarized the Court's position:
For the stage prior to approximately the end of the first trimester
the abortion decision and its effectuation must be left to the med
ical judgment of the pregnant woman's attending physician. For
the stage subsequent to approximately the end of the first trimes
ter, the State, in promoting its interest in the health of the
mother, may, if it chooses, regulate the abortion procedure in
ways that are reasonably related to maternal health. For the
stage subsequent to viability, the State in promoting its interest in
the potentiality of human life may, if it chooses, regulate and
even proscribe abortion except where it is necessary, in appropri
ate medical judgment, for the preservation of the life or health of
46.

[d.

47. More is said about the "trimester framework" in this paper. See infra text
accompanying note 51; see infra notes 74 and 149.
48. "Viable" means being able to live outside the mother's womb. Roe, 410 U.S.
at 163; see infra note 93.
49. [d. at 161. "Quick" comes from the English statutes that made abortion after
"quickening" an offense. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 952
(1992).
50. Roe, 410 U.S. at 162.
51. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 873; see also infra Part II. D.
52. Roe, 410 U.S. at 162.
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the mother. 53

Measured by these standards, the Court concluded that the
Texas statute, which permitted an abortion only for the purpose of
saving the life of the mother, "swe[pt] too broadly," and struck the
statute down on due process grounds. 54
II.

SUPREME COURT PROGENY OF ROE

As with most judicial decisions, post-Roe embellishments have
had the effect of both expanding and contracting the scope of the
decision. An examination of Roe's progeny helps to distinguish the
essential Roe holding from later embellishments - in other words,
to separate the Roe wheat from the progeny chaff.
A.

Separation of Church and State

As discussed above, Part IX of the Roe majority opinion dealt
with Texas's argument that a "person" is created at conception and
the State therefore has an interest in protecting that person during
the length of the pregnancy.55 The Court recognized that the State
does have an interest in protecting potential life, but the Court
stopped short of determining when, exactly, "life" begins. 56 It
seems that the Court, in terming the "life" question "sensitive and
difficult," was nodding to the essentially sectarian and personal na
ture of such a determination. 57 In the following cases it is clear that
the Court has continually reserved judgment on the question of
when "life" begins - and has not allowed legislators to overstep this
boundary, either.
In Maher v. Roe,58 the Court upheld governmental regulations
that withheld public funds for non-therapeutic abortions, but al
lowed payments for medical services related to childbirth, permit
ting a government to favor childbirth over abortion through the
allocation of other public resources, such as hospitals and medical
staff.59 Under Maher the government may, in other words, make a
value judgment to support birth over abortion through various in
53.
54.
55.

Id. at 164.
Id. at 164.
Id. at 156-62.
56. Id. at 159-60.
57. Id. at 162 ("[W]e do not agree that, by adopting one theory of life, Texas may
override the rights of the pregnant woman that are at stake.").
58. 432 U.S. 464 (1977).
59. The Court opined that Roe implied no limitation on a state's authority to
make a value judgment favoring childbirth over abortion. Id. at 474.
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centives, but the determination of what is "life" must be left to the
medical community, divorced from any sectarian position. Thus, in
Colautti v. Franklin, the Court struck down the Pennsylvania Abor
tion Control Act, which governed the determination of viability.60
The Court made clear that neither the legislature nor the courts
may proclaim the ascertainment of viability-the viability determi
nation must be a matter for the responsible attending physician. 61
Sixteen years after Roe and with four changes in its composi
tion,62 the Court sustained the principle of the separation of church
and state in Webster v. Reproductive Health Services ,63 where it con
sidered certain provisions of a Missouri abortion statute. Chief Jus
tice Rehnquist authored the majority opinion, which refused to rule
on the constitutionality of the statute's preamble proclaiming that
life began at conception. 64 The Court determined that it need not
consider the constitutionality of the preamble for essentially two
reasons. First, Roe does not impose a limitation on a state's author
ity to make a value judgment favoring childbirth over abortion, and
the preamble can be read simply to express that sort of value judg
ment. 65 The second reason given by the Court was that until the
courts of Missouri have used the preamble in some litigated matter
it is premature for the Supreme Court to interpret it. 66
The opinion declared that provisions of the statute forbidding
the use of public funds, employees, or public facilities for the pur
pose of encouraging or counseling a woman to have an abortion
60. 439 U.S. 379, 380 (1979). The ostensible ground was vagueness, but the Court
made it clear that the trimester framework incorporated only one definition of viabil
ity-the Court's-as the Court forbade states to decide that a certain objective indica
tor (be it weeks of gestation, fetal weight, or any other) should govern the definition of
viability. Id. at 388-89.
61. Id.
62. The Roe Court consisted of Justice Blackmun, Chief Justice Burger and Jus
tices Douglas, Stuart, Powell, Brennan, and Marshall in the majority, and Justices Rehn
quist and White in dissent. The Webster Court consisted of Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justices White, O'Connor, Kennedy, and Scalia in the majority, and Justices Brennan,
Marshall, and Blackmun in the dissent. Justice Stevens concurred in part and dissented
in part.
63. Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490 (1989).
64. The preamble to the statute set forth findings that "the life of each human
being begins at conception" and that "unborn children have protectable interests in life,
health and well-being;" and that all Missouri state laws be "interpreted to provide un
born children with the same rights enjoyed by other persons subject to the Federal
Constitution and Supreme Court precedents." Id. at 501.
65. Id. at 504-07.
66. Id. at 506-07.
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which was not necessary to save her life were unconstitutional,67
and found constitutional the portion of the statute requiring a phy
sician, prior to performing an abortion on a woman he has reason
to believe is twenty or more weeks pregnant, to ascertain whether
the fetus is viable by performing such medical examination and
other tests as are necessary to make a finding of the fetus's gesta
tional age, weight, and lung maturity.68 The Court refused to grant
the request of the Missouri Attorney General, counsel for the ap
pellees and the United States, to overrule Roe v. Wade. 69 The
Court would not do so because the case at bar was distinguishable
from Roe.7° Missouri in this case determined that "viability is the
point at which [the State's] interest in potential life must be safe
guarded."71 In Roe, Texas "criminalized ... all abortions, except
when the mother's life was at stake."72
Only Justices White and Kennedy joined the part of Rehn
quist's opinion dealing with the viability test. That "plurality"73
found that the gestational provision of the statute created a pre
sumption of viability at twenty weeks that could be rebutted only
by test results indicating that the fetus was not viable.74 Roe, they
said, held that the State had an interest in the potentiality of human
life.75 However, the plurality argued that the State's compelling in
terest in human life, recognized in Roe, should extend throughout
67. The statute made it unlawful to use public funds, employees, or facilities for
the purpose of encouraging or counseling a woman to have an abortion which was not
necessary to save her life. The Court found that the statute was not unconstitutional, as
the State was not mandated to "commit any resources to facilitating abortions even if it
could turn a profit by doing so." Id. at 511. The Court also said that, "The Constitution
does not forbid a State or city, pursuant to democratic processes, from expressing a
preference for normal childbirth." Webster, 492 U.S. at 511 (quoting Maher v. Roe, 432
U.S. 464, 474 (1977)).
68. Id. at 513-21.
69. Id. at 521.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 521.
73. Justice Blackmun refers to Justices Rehnquist, White, and Kennedy, as the
"plurality." See id. at 537 and in seriatim throughout his opinion. Justice O'Connor
also uses the term. See id. at 525 and in seriatim. It is also found in the Syllabus. See id.
at 495. Justice Scalia joined in all of the "plurality" opinion, except the section discuss
ing viability, because he agreed with Justice Blackmun that "it effectively would over
rule Roe v. Wade." Id. at 532. He wanted Roe overruled, but explicitly. Id.
74. It was in Part II D of their opinion, dealing with protection to the fetus, that
the plurality took a swing at the "trimester framework" dealing with the mother's
health: "the rigid Roe framework is hardly consistent with the notions of a Constitution
cast in general terms, as ours is ...." See id. at 518.
75. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 162.
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pregnancy rather than come into existence only at the point of via
bility.76 Hence, the plurality argued that Roe's viability require
ment should be abandoned.77 Having said that, the plurality rested
on the medical nature of the viability determination: "The Missouri
testing requirement here is reasonably designed to ensure that
abortions are not performed where the fetus is viable-an end
which all concede is legitimate-and that is sufficient to sustain its
constitutionality."78
Justice Blackmun, joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall,
concurred in part and dissented in part. The dissent was directed
mainly against the preamble of the statute and its viability-testing
provisions. 79 Blackmun concluded his opinion with the following
words: "For today, at least, the law of abortion stands undisturbed.
For today, the women of this Nation still retain the liberty to con
trol their destinies. But the signs are evident and very ominous, and
a chill wind blows. "80
Justice Blackmun severely criticized the "plurality":81 "Never
in my memory has a plurality announced a judgment of this Court
that so foments disregard for the law and for our standing deci
sions.... Nor in my memory has a plurality gone about its business
in such a deceptive fashion."82 The charge of deception must have
come from his conclusion that the plurality was trying to overrule
Roe without specifically so stating. 83 Indeed, in a recent article,
Dawn E. Johnson stated that "the Court's 1989 decision in Webster
v. Reproductive Health Services suggests that the Court was at most
one judicial appointment away from overruling Roe and allowing
states to criminalize abortion."84 But it was the plurality's position
that state legislatures had the right to provide for viability testing,
particularly since Roe held that the State had an interest in the po
76. Webster, 492 U.S. at 519.
77. Id. at 518-19.
78. Id. at 520.
79. ld. at 537-56. It is not clear from a reading of Justice Blackmun's opinion with
which part of the Court's judgment he concurred. The preamble's constitutionality was
determined in the majority opinion, and the viability-testing part was addressed in the
plurality opinion. While his opinion does not explicitly so state, it could be concluded
that his concurrence was with Part II C of the plurality opinion. See id. at 539 n.l.
80. ld. at 560.
8l. Justices White and Kennedy, in addition to Chief Justice Rehnquist.
82. Jd. at 538.
83. Id. at 537.
84. Dawn E. Johnson, Functional Departmentalizationism and Nonjudicial Inter
pretation: Who Determines Constitutional Meaning?, 67 LAW AND CONTEMP. PROBS.
105, 145 (2004).
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tentiality of human life. 85 This appears to be a logical extension of
Roe, well within the confines of the argument that the courts should
not engage in such sectarian pursuits as attempting to determine
when life begins. 86
Adherence to the principle of the separation of church and
state is reinforced in the Court's later, landmark case Planned
Parenthood v. Casey, discussed below. First, we turn to an intro
duction of other key elements of the Roe decision.

B.

Grist for the Litigation Mill

Roe held that the point at which the State's interest in protect
ing potential life becomes compelling is the point of "viability,"87
which the Court determined occurs at approximately seven months,
though possibly as early as twenty-four weeks. 88 However, this de
termination of when, exactly, "viability" occurs was incidental and
not intrinsic to the holding that the State's interest becomes com
pelling at viability. The following cases demonstrate that what con
stitutes "viability" is a fluid question, depending on medical
advances, that may be debated continually in the years to come,
and that an overruling of Roe is not necessary to allow such changes
in the understanding of viability. Roe also held that the point at
which the State's interest in protecting the health of the mother be
comes compelling is "approximately the end of the first trimes
ter."89 But this "rigid trimester framework" has, similarly, proven
inessential to the Roe holding. Indeed, the Court's move from the
trimester framework to the "substantial burden" test in Planned
Parenthood v. Casey demonstrates as much. The seeds of the sub
stantial burden test were planted in the cases leading up to the
Casey decision.
At issue in City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive
Health, Inc., (Akron I), was a city ordinance requiring that all abor
tions after the first trimester be performed in a hospital; that the
attending physician must obtain the consent of a parent of a minor
under 15 years of age, or a court order; that the attending physician
inform the patient of the status of her pregnancy, the development
of the fetus, the date of possible viability, the physical and emo
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

See supra text accompanying notes 36-38.
See infra text accompanying notes 164-69.
Roe, 410 U.S. at 163.
Id. at 160.
Id. at 163.
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tional complications that may result from an abortion, the availabil
ity of agencies to provide her with assistance and information
regarding birth control, adoption, and childbirth; a twenty-four
hour waiting period after the physician receives a signed consent
from the patient; and that the fetal remains be disposed of in a "hu
mane and sanitary manner."90 The ordinance was struck down as
unconstitutional.91
The Court's opinion began with a reaffirmation of Roe on the
basis of stare decisis.92 The main thrust of the opinion was that
under Roe the State has two interests in the area of abortions
first, protection of the potentiality of human life,93 and second, pro
tection of the mother's health. 94 In its analysis, the Court deter
mined that the ordinances imposed a significant burden on a
woman's access to an abortion without any showing of necessity to
meet the State's interests. 95 Though the Akron I Court specifically
reaffirmed Roe,96 the Casey Court overruled Akron I to the extent
that it was inconsistent with Roe's statement that a "State has a
legitimate interest in promoting the life or potential life of the un
born."97 In her dissent, Justice O'Connor, joined by Justices White
and Rehnquist,98 forecast her displeasure with the trimester frame
work of Roe. 99 She initially wrote, "The decision of the Court to
day graphically illustrates why the trimester approach is a
completely unprincipled method of accommodating the conflicting
90. City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc. (Akron I), 462
U.S. 416, 422-24 (1983).
91. Id. at 431, 452.
92. Id. at 419-20. Justice Powell wrote the six member majority opinion. Powell
described Roe v. Wade as holding "the right of privacy, grounded in the concept of
personal liberty guaranteed by the Constitution, encompasses a woman's right to decide
whether to terminate her pregnancy." Id. at 419.
93. Id. at 428. Pursuant to Roe, this interest becomes compelling only at viabil
ity-the point at which the fetus "has the capability of meaningful life outside the
mother's womb." Roe, 410 U.S. at 163.
94. Akron I, 462 U.S. at 428-29. Pursuant to Roe, the health of the mother does
not become compelling until the end of the first trimester. Roe, 410 U.S. at 163.
95. Akron I, 462 U.S. at 428. Justice O'Connor, joined by Justice White and then
Justice Rehnquist, dissented, saying, inter alia, that "[h ]ealth-related factors that may
legitimately be considered by the State go well beyond what various medical organiza
tions have to say about the physical safety of a particular procedure." Id. at 467.
96. See supra text accompanying note 104.
97. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 870 (1992), infra
Part II. D, in a joint opinion written by Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter.
98. Justices White and Rehnquist were the two dissenters in Roe. Justice
O'Connor, however, would go on to author the Casey opinion, affirming the Roe hold
ing while doing away with the trimester framework.
99. Akron 1,462 U.S. at 452.
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personal rights and compelling state interests that are involved in
the abortion context."lOO At the urging of Justice Blackmun she
changed the word "unprincipled" to "unworkable" because "she
wanted to avoid anything that even indirectly appeared to be an ad
hominem attack."lOl
Vexation was beginning to show on the Court with the direc
tion in which Roe's progeny were taking the Roe holding, though
not necessarily with the holding of Roe itself. In Thornburgh v.
American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, the Court
struck down Pennsylvania's Abortion Control Statute, which con
tained six requirements for an abortion to be permitted. 102 In his
Thornburgh dissent, Chief Justice Burger wrote, "The extent to
which the Court has departed from the limitations expressed in Roe
is readily apparent."103 Also dissenting, Justice White wrote, "The
Court engages not in constitutional interpretation, but in the unre
strained imposition of its own, extraconstitutional value prefer
ences."104 Justice O'Connor (with whom then Justice Rehnquist
joined) wrote, "This Court's abortion decisions have already
worked a major distortion in the Court's constitutional jurispru
dence. "105 Although the Thornburgh Court specifically reaffirmed
Roe,106 as it had in Akron I, the Casey Court overruled Thornburgh
to the extent that it was inconsistent with Roe's statement that a
state has a legitimate interest in promoting the life, or potential life,
of the unborn.l07
Hodgson v. Minnesota 108 answered what appeared to be a
100. LINDA GREENHOUSE, BECOMING JUSTICE BLACKMUN 144 (Henry Holt &
Co. 2005).
101. ld.
102. Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476
U.S. 747, 772 (1986). The requirements were 1) that women be advised that medical
assistance may be available, 2) that women be advised that the child's father is responsi
ble for financial assistance, 3) that the physician inform the woman of detrimental
physical and psychological effects and of all medical risks of abortions, 4) that women
be advised of certain reporting requirements, 5) that women be advised of provisions
governing the degree of care for post-viability abortions, and 6) that a second physician
is present during an abortion. Id. at 763-64. The last provision, about the second physi
cian, was struck down only because it contained no exception for an emergency. Id. at
770-71.
103. Id. at 783.
104. ld. at 794.
105. ld. at 814.
106. ld. at 759.
107. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 870 (1992); see infra
Part II. D.
108. 497 U.S. 417 (1990).
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question of limited proportions with a complex set of opinions cov
ering a wide range of subjects. The Minnesota statute at issue pro
vided that, with certain exceptions, no female under the age of
eighteen years could obtain an abortion unless both of her parents
were notified, and even then a forty-eight hour waiting period was
required.1 09 The statute did provide for a "judicial bypass," by
which the minor could seek a court order finding that she possessed
sufficient maturity to make the decision of whether to abort her
pregnancy without parental notification. The United States Court
of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held the two-parent notice re
quirement unconstitutional because it was an unreasonable re
straint upon a young woman's liberty. The notice requirement with
the judicial bypass provision, however, was constitutional and saved
the statute from being declared wholly invalid.1l0 On appeal, the
Court affirmed the Eighth Circuit's decision, holding that the two
parent notice requirement without judicial bypass was unconstitu
tional.1 11 Justice Kennedy, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justices White and Scalia wrote an opinion concurring in part and
dissenting in part. The dissent took the position that the require
ment of notice to both parents was constitutional even without the
judicial bypass provision. 112
Justice O'Connor wrote a separate concurring opinion.113 Jus
tice Marshall, joined by Justices Brennan and Blackmun, wrote a
separate concurring and dissenting opinion, primarily clarifying that
he thought that the bypass did not save the statute because the pro
vision itself was unconstitutional,114 and that the forty-eight hour
waiting period burdened the rights of minors.1 15
Justice Scalia wrote a separate opinion, concurring in part and
dissenting in part.1 16 He noted the fragmentation over abortion
cases into which the Court was drifting, which prompted him to
write:
The random and unpredictable results of our consequently un
channeled individual views make it increasingly evident, Term af
109.
110.

111.

[d. at 422; MINN. STAT. § 144 343(2)-(7) (1998).
Hodgson, 497 U.S. at 431.
/d. at 422-23.
[d. at 500.

112.
113. Justice O'Connor agreed that a woman's decision to conceive or bear a child
is a component part of her liberty, which is protected by the Fourteenth Amendment's
Due Process Clause. [d. at 458.
114. [d. at 461-62.
115. [d. at 467.
116. [d. at 479-80.
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ter Term, that the tools for this job are not to be found in the
lawyer's-and hence not in the judge's-workbox. I continue to
dissent from this enterprise of devising an Abortion Code, and
from the illusion that we have authority to do SO.117

Justice Scalia's words notwithstanding, Roe has so far proven
able to overarch such debate and encompass a wide variety of
views. Differing determinations of the terms "viability" and "sub
stantial obstacle" do not require an overruling of Roe. This be
comes most clear in the Court's later, landmark case Planned
Parenthood v. Casey, discussed below. First, we turn to an intro
duction of a final key element of the Roe decision.
C.

Theories of Privacy Right

Roe v. Wade held that a state statute that made it a crime to
obtain, or attempt to obtain, an abortion, except for the purpose of
saving the life or protecting the health of the mother, was unconsti
tutional. 118 The rationale of the case was that liberty, which is guar
anteed by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
to the Constitution of the United States, is broad enough to include
a right of privacy.119 The right of privacy includes the right, though
not unqualified,120 to decide whether to terminate an unwanted
pregnancy.121
Wilson Huhn points out that the present Court122 is split into
two schools of thought concerning the constitutional basis for the
right of privacy, which is not explicitly mentioned in the Constitu
tion. 123 One school of thought 124 takes the position that the right of
privacy is not defined by reference to specific American traditions,
but rather by reference to society'S "emerging awareness" of the
effect of laws on people's lives,125 The other school of thought 126
Id. at 480.
410 U.S. 113, 164 (1973).
119. Id. at 152-53.
120. The "state may properly assert important interests in safeguarding health, in
maintaining medical standards, and in protecting potential life." Id. at 154-55.
121. Id. at 153.
122. The recent replacement of Chief Justice Rehnquist with Chief Justice Rob
erts is not factored into this theory, and Chief Justice Roberts's appointment to the
Court is too recent to place him in one or the other school of thought on this issue.
123. See Wilson Huhn, The Jurisprudential Revolution: Unlocking Human Poten
tial in Grutter and Lawrence, 12 WM. & MARY BILL RTs. J. 65, 76 (2003).
124. Consisting of Justices Stevens, Kennedy, O'Connor, Souter, Breyer, and
Ginsburg.
125. Referring to the Supreme Court's decision in Lawrence v. Texas, Huhn bases
his conclusion not on the fact that sodomy had a history of approval, but that in this
117.
118.
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sees tradition as the only legitimate source of our unen:lmerated
rights. 127 In other words, six members look not to whether privacy
has been considered a constitutionally guaranteed right, but to
whether privacy is thought of as "a general right to make 'personal
and intimate choices' that are 'central to personal dignity and au
tonomy.' "128 Huhn writes:
[I]n Lawrence the majority of the Supreme Court embraced an
expansive definition of the 'right to privacy,' adopting the pas
sage from the plurality opinion in Casey that people are free to
make 'intimate and personal choices' not because these choices
are 'traditional' rights, but because these choices are 'central to
personal dignity and autonomy .... [I]t has now been accepted by
six members of the Supreme Court as expressing their under
standing of the right to privacy. By focusing on the effect that
the law has on a person's personal, intimate choices, this doctri
nal shift legitimizes the consequentialist approach that Justice
Blackmun employed in Roe in applying the right to privacy.129

Indeed, the 6-3 division among the justices into these two
schools of thought regarding the right to privacy suggests that a ma
jority of the current Court would not vote to overrule Roe ,130
D.

Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey
(1992)

The foregoing arguments regarding why Roe v. Wade will not
likely be overruled in the near future are further grounded in the
country there is "an emerging awareness that liberty gives substantial protection to
adult persons in deciding how to conduct their private lives in matters pertaining to
sex." Huhn, 12 WM. & MARY BILL RTS J. at 76, (quoting from Lawrence v. Texas, 539
U.S. 558,571 (2003».
126. Consisting of Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Thomas.
127. This position is best illustrated in note 6 of Justice Scalia's opinion in
Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 127 (1989) (upholding a California statute which
denied a biological father a right to establish his paternity of a child conceived by his
sexual partner, a woman who was married to another man). The essence of the position
is represented by the following words: "Although assuredly having the virtue (if it be
that) of leaving judges free to decide as they think best when the unanticipated occurs, a
rule of law that binds neither by text nor by any particular, identifiable tradition is no
rule of law at all." Id. at 127 n.6. This is consistent with Justice Scalia's well known
description of California's traditional in-state service rule to the effect that "its valida
tion is its pedigree." See Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604, 621 (1990).
128. Huhn, supra note 123, at 73.
129. Id. at 76-77.
130. Even if both Roberts and O'Connor's replacement join the school of tradi
tion, the split would still be 5-4 in favor of upholding Roe on the grounds that abortion
is a privacy right not specifically defined by tradition.
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Supreme Court's holding in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern
Pennsylvania v. Casey, where the Court reviewed several amend
ments to a Pennsylvania statute. l3l The amendments required 1)
that a woman seeking an abortion give consent in writing prior to
the abortion, and that she be supplied with certain information at
least twenty-four hours prior to the abortion; 2) that if the woman
was a minor, the informed consent had to be given by one parent;132
and 3) that married women were required to sign a statement that
they had obtained their husband's consent. 133 These three require
ments were excused in the event of a "medical emergency."134
Before the Act took effect, the petitioners (five abortion clinics and
a physician) sought declaratory and injunctive relief in a United
States District Court. The court held the Pennsylvania statute un
constitutional and permanently enjoined. its enforcement. 135 The
Third Circuit upheld all of the statutory restrictions except the hus
band notification provision. 136 At oral argument before the U.S.
Supreme Court, the petitioners argued that none of the State's re
quirements could be upheld without overruling Roe v. Wade.!37
Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter wrote the major portions
of the Court's "joint" opinion.!38 While they acknowledged that
the Court's "decisions after Roe cast doubt upon the meaning and
reach of its holding,"139 they did not agree with the petitioners that
Roe must be overruled to uphold the amendments in question,140
although they did not uphold all of the amendments. "After con
sidering the fundamental constitutional questions resolved by Roe,
principles of institutional integrity and the rule of stare decisis we
conclude this: the essential holding of Roe v. Wade should be re
tained and once again reaffirmed."141
The authors of the joint opinion lost no time in making clear
just what they considered was the "essential holding" of Roe v.
131. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
132. The amendment also provided a judicial bypass provision. Id. at 844.
133. Id.
134. Id. A fifth amendment required abortion facilities meet certain reporting
and record-keeping requirements. Id. This amendment is not addressed in this Article.
135. [d. at 845.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 845.
138. Id. at 843.
139. Id. at 845. They added that Chief Justice Rehnquist admitted "that he would
overrule Roe and adopt the rational relationship test as the sole criterion of constitu
tionality." Id.
140. Id. at 845.
141. Id. at 845-46.
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Wade. It contained three major points: 142
First, recognition of the right of a woman to choose to have an
abortion before viability and to obtain it without undue interfer
ence from the State. Before viability the State's interests are not
strong enough to support prohibition of abortion or the imposi
tion of a substantial obstacle to the woman's effective right to
elect the procedure. Second, a confirmation of the State's power
to restrict abortions after fetal viability if the law contains excep
tions for pregnancies which endanger the woman's life or health.
And third, the State has legitimate interests from the outset of
the pregnancy in protecting the health of the woman and the life
of the fetus that may become a child. 143

In its reaffirmation of Roe, the joint opinion made clear that
"[a]lthough Roe has engendered opposition, it has in no sense
proven 'unworkable,' representing as it does a simple limitation be
yond which a state law is unenforceable."144 The "workability" of
the Roe holding was an essential part of the Court's stare decisis
determination. Admittedly, the Court also emphasized the effects
that overruling Roe could have on the public and on the Court's
legitimacy:
[I]t is a constitutional liberty of the woman to have some free
dom to terminate her pregnancy. We conclude that the basic de
cision in Roe was based on a constitutional analysis which we
cannot now repudiate. The woman's liberty is not so unlimited,
however, that from the outset the State cannot show its concern
for the life of the unborn, and at a later point in fetal develop
ment the State's interest in life has sufficient force so that the
right of the woman to terminate the pregnancy can be
restricted. 145

The Court stated, almost with a plea, that:
A decision to overrule Roe's essential holding under the existing
circumstances would address error, if error there was, at the cost
of both profound and unnecessary damage to the Court's legiti
macy, and to the Nation's commitment to the rule of law. It is
therefore imperative to adhere to the essence of Roe's original
142. [d. at 846.
143. The authors said that this was the "most central principle" of the case, a rule
of law and a component of liberty that they could not renounce. See id. at 871. Later in
the joint opinion they said that "before that time [viability] the woman has a right to
choose to terminate her pregnancy." [d. at 870.
144. [d. at 855 (citations omitted).
145. [d. at 869.
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decision, and we do so today.146
The joint opinion has been criticized for its appeal to the "dam
age to the Court's legitimacy" that would result from an overruling
of Roe. Michael Stokes Paulsen says:
This is an astonishing proposition. What if the thing that makes
a decision a "watershed" is that it was a grotesque departure
from the Constitution-a massive, unfounded judicial coup d'etat
taken in the name of the Constitution? The notion that the more
dramatic a precedent's departure from the Constitution, the
more tenaciously the Court should cling to it-lest the people
recognize the departure for the lawlessness it is-is positively
repulsive. 147
This may be so, but the Court's upholding of Roe was not pre
mised solely on the desire to avoid the problems overruling Roe
would generate; the Court felt the Roe holding was still practicable.
Casey's holding is profound, though not as broad as its 169 page
length might indicate. 148 It simply rejected the so-called "trimester
framework" of Roe. 149 The Court used the essential holding of Roe
to craft an updated method of balancing the State's interests against
those of the mother. 150 In Part IV of the opinion, the Court re
placed the trimester framework with the "undue burden" test,
which seeks to determine whether a state has exceeded its constitu
tional authority to place some limits on a woman's right to choose
in abortion cases. 151
146.
147.

Id.
Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Worst Constitutional Decision of All Time, 78
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 995, 1031 (2003).
148. What the Court in Casey referred to as Roe's "essential holding" (see supra
text accompanying note 142-43), is really the rationale for the Casey holding. In order
to overrule Roe both its holding and its rationale would have to be discarded by the
Court. See Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 872-73, 878-79 (1992).
149. The trimester framework of Roe was, in essence, that state legislatures were
free to place restrictions on the right of a woman to choose an abortion after approxi
mately the end of the first trimester of pregnancy, but that prior to that time the preg
nant woman was free to make her own informed choice. Casey, 505 U.S. at 879.
150. Id. at 873, 878. There had been discontent with the so-called trimester
framework for some time. Justice White in his dissent in Planned Parenthood of Central
Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 99 (1976), wrote that the trimester framework had
caused the Court to serve as the country's "ex officio medical board with powers to
approve or disapprove medical and operative practice and standards throughout the
United States."
151. The trimester framework was found to be "unsound in principle and un
workable in practice" by Chief Justice Rehnquist writing for himself and Justice Ken
nedy in Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 518 (1989) (citation
omitted).
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The "undue burden" test was considered "the appropriate
means of reconciling the State's interest with the woman's constitu
tionally protected liberty."152 Under this test, if the purpose or ef
fect of abortion legislation is to place a substantial obstacle in the
path of a woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus, it will be
held unconstitutional, as an "undue burden" on the pregnant wo
man.1 53 The joint opinion stated:
A finding of an undue burden is a shorthand for the conclusion
that a state regulation has the purpose or effect of placing a sub
stantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion of a
nonviable fetus. A statute with this purpose is invalid because
the means chosen by the State to further the interest in potential
life must be calculated to inform the woman's free choice, not
hinder it. And a statute which, while furthering the interest in
potential life or some other valid state interest, has the effect of
placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman's choice
cannot be considered a permissible means of serving its legiti
mate ends. 154

The Court reiterated the sanctity of the woman's right to
choose,155 but emphasized that the State had strong interests in pro
tecting the life of the unborn:
Though the woman has a right to choose to terminate or continue
her pregnancy before viability, it does not at all follow that the
State is prohibited from taking steps to ensure that this choice is
thoughtful and informed. Even in the earliest stages of preg
nancy, the State may enact rules and regulations designed to en
courage her to know that there are philosophic and social
arguments of great weight that can be brought to bear in favor of
continuing the pregnancy to full term and that there are proce
dures and institutions to allow adoption of unwanted children as
well as a certain degree of state assistance if the mother chooses
to raise the child herself. 156

In sum, the "trimester framework," in the Court's view, needed
replacing for it did not sufficiently recognize the State's interest in
the area of abortions. 157 The terms "substantial obstacle" and
"nonviable fetus" will be grist for the litigation mill for some time
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.

Casey, 505 U.S. at 876.
[d.
[d. at 877.
[d. at 872.
[d.

[d. at 876.
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to come.1 58 The need for construction, however, is not a ground for
overruling an opinion that leaves room for interpretation.
In Part IV of the opinion, the Court also addressed that aspect
of Roe v. Wade that makes it an anathema to large segments of the
Judeo-Christian community-that is, the question when life be
gins. 159 Many people believe that life begins at conception, and
that giving a woman a choice to abort a pregnancy is giving her a
right to commit murder.160 The authors of the Casey joint opinion
realized that they were at "the point where much criticism ha[ d]
been directed at Roe."161 Casey did not go so far as to attempt an
answer to the question of when life begins, but repeated that it was
at the point at which the fetus became "viable" or "quick" that the
State had an interest in imposing regulation on abortions. 162 The
joint opinion attempted a definition of "viability" as "the time at
which there is a realistic possibility of maintaining and nourishing a
life outside the womb, so that the independent existence of the sec
ond life can in reason and all fairness be the object of state protec
tion that now overrides the rights of the woman."163 This
explanation of when life begins is no more definite than that at
tempted by Justice Blackmun in Roe v. Wade. But this must be
acceptable. It is not the function of the Supreme Court or any court
in a country that maintains a separation of church and state,164 to
make judicial pronouncements upon non-secular matters.1 65 Would
not the "realistic possibility of maintaining and nourishing a life
outside the womb"166 encompass religious beliefs, moral convic
tions, "biological appreciations,"167 and just plain "gut" reactions as
158. The joint opinion's definition of "viability" will help. See supra note 48.
159. [d. at 869-79.
160. See Madsen v. Women's Health Ctf., 512 U.S. 753, 787 (1994) (listing the
phrase "God Calls It Murder" as an example of one of the phrases held up on a sign at
a protest outside an abortion clinic).
161. Casey, 505 U.S. at 869.
162. [d. at 870; Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 160-61 (1973); see supra text accompa
nying notes 48-49.
163. Casey, 505 U.S. at 870.
164. See U.S. CONST. amend. I.
165. See Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379,390-97 (1979) (striking down a statute
which governed the determination of viability; see also Casey, 505 U.S at 949 (Rehn
quist, c.J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
166. Casey, 505 U.S. at 870 (referring to a position taken in Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. at 163).
167. Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 763 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting). "For those
who share an abiding moral or religious conviction (or for that matter, simply a biologi
cal appreciation) that abortion is the taking of a human life, there is no option but to
persuade women, one by one, not to make that choice." [d.
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to whether life begins at conception?
Men and women of good conscience can disagree, and we sup
pose some always shall disagree, about the profound moral and
spiritual implications of terminating a pregnancy, even in its ear
liest stage. Some of us as individuals find abortion offensive to
our most basic principles of morality, but that cannot control our
decision. Our obligation is to define the liberty of all, not to man
date our own moral code. 168

It is sufficient for courts to allow citizens to make their own

decisions as to whether abortion is a sin-an inherently sectarian
determination. There is nothing in Roe v. Wade that requires an
abortion if the pregnant woman, for any reason, does not want it. 169
Regarding the right to privacy, the authors of the joint opinion
reiterated that the constitutional protection of the woman's deci
sion to terminate her pregnancy derives from the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which prevents deprivation
of "life, liberty or property." The Court intended to place emphasis
on "liberty."17o Justice Scalia wrote a twenty-two page dissent,
joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White and
Thomas. l7l In his dissent, Scalia made an astounding declaration
about his version of the basis of the right of a pregnant woman to
abort her pregnancy: "liberty includes only those practices, defined
at the most specific level, that were protected against government
interference by other rules of law when the Fourteenth Amend
ment was ratified."I72 Since abortion was not being regulated at the
end of the Civil War, it was not encompassed by the word "liberty,"
according to Justice Scalia. As discussed earlier, 173 however, the
justices who would take this traditionalist approach to the right of
privacy are in the minority, even if both Chief Justice Roberts and
Justice O'Connor's replacement take the traditionalist approachY4
168. Casey, 505 U.S. at 850-51.
169. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 154 (concluding the abortion decision is a personal
right). The remarks of Justice Scalia in a concurring opinion in Webster v. Reproduc
tive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 532 (1989), to the effect that Roe represents a "self
awarded sovereignty over a field where it has little proper business since the answers to
most of the cruel questions posed are political and not juridical" are completely off the
mark.
170. Casey, 505 U.S. at 846.
171. [d. at 979.
172. [d. at 981.
173. See supra Part II. C.
174. Justices Stevens, Kennedy, Souter, Breyer, and Ginsburg would presumably
remain in the "emerging awareness" school.
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Casey therefore encapsulated the theories found in Roe and its
progeny regarding the separation of church and state, the right to
privacy, and the concept that Roe is a working framework within
which "viability" and "substantial obstacle" may be developed.

E.

A Blueprint For Overruling A Supreme Court Precedent:
Lawrence v. Texas (2003)

Lawrence v. Texas 175 is not a progeny of Roe v. Wade, but it is
discussed in this article because it provides a list of factors that the
Court will consider in overruling a prior Supreme Court case. In
Lawrence, the Court declared unconstitutional a Texas statute mak
ing it a crime for two persons of the same gender to engage in cer
tain intimate sexual conduct.1 76 The opinion of the Court, written
by Justice Kennedy, proclaimed that the Texas statute was unconsti
tutional and that a precedent, Bowers v. Hardwick,l77 was over
ruled. 178 Bowers had held that a state law criminalizing sodomy as
applied to homosexuals did not violate substantive due process. 179
Justice Kennedy assigned eight reasons for overruling Bowers:
(1) the Bowers Court misinterpreted the issue;180 (2) legislators' at
titudes had changed;181 (3) two Supreme Court decisions had cast
Bowers' holding in doubt;182 (4) in the United States, criticism of
Bowers had been "substantial and continuing, disapproving of its
reasoning in all respects ... the courts of five states ha[d] declined
to follow it";183 (5) the European Court of Human Rights did not
follow it;184 (6) it could not be saved by stare decisis;185 (7) it "had
175. 539 u.s. 558 (2003).
176. In the case the men were convicted of sodomy. Id. at 563.
177. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
178. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578.
179. [d. at 567.
180. The Bowers Court had said that the issue was whether homosexuals had the
right to engage in sodomy; it appears that the Court completely misapprehended the
defendants' claim of liberty. Id. at 566-67.
181. At the time Bowers was decided twenty five states had similar laws. In 2003,
the count was thirteen. [d. at 573.
182. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) cast doubt on
Bowers because it emphasized the Constitutional demands for the autonomy of the
person in making choices concerning marriage, procreation, contraception, family rela
tionships, child rearing, and education. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 573-74. Romer v. Evans,
517 U.S. 620 (1996) cast doubt on Bowers because in that case the Court found that a
class-based piece of legislation (directed against homosexuals, lesbians and bisexuals)
had no rational relation to a legitimate governmental purpose. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at
574.
183. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 576.
184. [d.
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not induced detrimental reliance comparable to some instances
where recognized individual rights are involved";186 and (8) the ra
tionale of Bowers could not withstand careful analysis. 187 Unlike in
Lawrence, it is unlikely that a majority of the current Court will
find that Roe's holding falls short of so many factors. Indeed, in
Casey, the Court found insufficient indication that Roe was un
workable precedent.
So in this case we may enquire whether Roe's central rule has
been found unworkable; whether the rule's limitation on state
power could be removed without serious inequity to those who
have relied upon it or significant damage to the stability of the
society governed by it; whether the law's growth in the interven
ing years has left Roe's central rule a doctrinal anachronism dis
counted by society; and whether Roe's premises of fact have so
far changed in the ensuing two decades as to render its central
holding somehow irrelevant or unjustifiable in dealing with the
issue it addressed. 188
Although there is significant public discomfort with the Roe
holding, it will not be as simple as arguing that "life" begins at con
ception to effect an overruling. Rather, the Court will look at myr
iad factors and will likely be looking for such tangibles as a change
in the attitudes of the American Medical Association and the
American Public Health Association regarding "viability."
III.

CONCLUSION

The resignation of Justice Sandra Day O'Connor and the death
of Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, and resulting changes on the
Court, have led many to question whether Roe will be overruled,
185. "The doctrine of stare decisis is essential to the respect accorded to the judg
ments of the Court and to the stability of law. It is not, however, an inexorable com
mand." [d. at 577 (citing Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 828 (1991». "[I]t is a
principle of policy and not a mechanical formula of adherence to the latest decision."
[d. (quoting Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 119 (1940».
186. [d. Justice Kennedy's exact words were: "Indeed, there has been no individ
ual or societal reliance on Bowers of the sort that could counsel against overturning its
holding once there are compelling reasons to do so." [d.
187. Justice Stevens dissented in Bowers. He wrote, "individual decisions by mar
ried persons, concerning the intimacies of their physical relationship, even when not
intended to produce offspring, are a form of 'liberty' protected by the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Moreover, this protection extends to intimate
choices by unmarried as well as married persons." Bowers, 478 U.S. at 216 (citation
omitted). Justice Kennedy said that Justice Stevens was correct and the majority in
Bowers was wrong. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578.
188. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 at 855 (1992).
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particularly given the more conservative bent of George W. Bush
appointees. This article offers at least four reasons why an overrul
ing of Roe is unlikely.
First, a majority of the Court supports an "emerging aware
ness" theory of the right to privacy, rather than a traditionalist ap
proach. Despite changing personnel on the Court, it is likely that
the "emerging awareness" school, a current majority on the Court,
would still deem abortion to be a "personal and intimate" decision,
and thus a privacy right.
Second, a basic premise of the Roe decision was that "viabil
ity" should be determined according to current medical standards,
rather than by any moral or religious notion of when "life" begins.
This approach is not likely to change, because it is grounded in the
foundational principle of the separation of church and state. The
concept of personal choice is protected by that fundamental princi
ple. It is worth noting here that we have a real impasse between the
life-at-conception believers (the so-called "right-to-life" people),
and those who believe that Roe v. Wade was the correct decision in
the matter of abortion (the so-called "pro-choice" people). Over
ruling Roe is not the way to resolve the problem. The shibboleths
"pro choice" and "pro life" only compound the impasse. That one is
"pro choice" does not mean that he or she is not also "pro life."
One may be "pro life" for himself, but leave to others what choice
they may make for themselves. Religion helps a person make a
choice for him or herself, but religion does not give one a license to
make that choice for another.1 89
Third, the terms "substantial obstacle" and "nonviable fetus"
will be grist for the litigation mill for some time to come. The need
for construction, however, is not a ground for overruling an opinion
that leaves room for interpretation. As the foregoing discussion of
Akron and Thornburgh demonstrated, the Court is reluctant to
overrule Roe-indeed, the Court specifically affirmed Roe-in the
face of differing interpretations of its holding. Rather, Roe has long
served as a framework within which the details can be fine-tuned.
Finally, the foregoing discussion of Lawrence indicates that the
Court would require more than differing philosophies among the
justices regarding when "life" begins to overrule Roe. The Court
189. Texas Supreme Court Justice Nathan Hecht said that "[r]eJigion says a lot
about who you are personally, but it says nothing about stare decisis, the commerce
clause, the First Amendment, [or] search and seizure ...." Nancy Gibbs, The Two
Knocks on Miers, TIME, October 17, 2005 at 40.
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would look to a number of factors, as it did in Lawrence, to deter
mine societal trends, including current medical standards.
On November 24, 2004, the First Circuit Court of Appeals held
unconstitutional a New Hampshire statute that prevented abortions
from being performed on unemancipated minors until forty-eight
hours passed following parental notification. 190 The statute waived
the notice provision if the abortion was necessary to save the life of
the minor, but it did not contain a similar waiver to protect the
minor's health in non- life threatening situations. During the prep
aration of this article, the United States Supreme Court heard the
case.l91 When the Court decides the case this term, the theories
posited in this article will be put to a test with perhaps two new
Justices sitting on the Court.

190. Planned Parenthood of N. New Eng. v. Heed, 390 F.3d 53 (1st Cir. 2004).
191. Heed, 390 F.3d at 53, cert. granted sub. nom., Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood
of N. New Eng., No. 04-1144,2005 WL 483164 (May 23, 2005). The case was heard on
November 30, 2005.

